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Abstract
We develop a framework in which individuals’ preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others
about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive
sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals
have the advantage of being able to deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions
in some of the matches. In the remaining matches, the individuals observe each other’s preferences. Our
main result shows that, essentially, only efficient outcomes can be stable. Moreover, under additional mild
assumptions, we show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from unilateral deviation
is smaller than the effective cost of deception in the environment. Finally, we extend our model to study
preferences that depend also on the opponent’s type.
Keywords: Evolution of Preferences; Indirect Evolutionary Approach; Theory of Mind; Depth of Rea-
soning; Deception; Efficiency. JEL codes: C72, C73, D03, D83.
1 Introduction
For a long time economists took preferences as given. The study of their origin and formation was considered a
question outside the scope of economics. Over the past two decades this has changed dramatically. In particular,
there is now a large literature on the evolutionary foundations of preferences (for an overview, see Robson
and Samuelson, 2011). A prominent strand of this literature is the so-called “indirect evolutionary approach,”
pioneered by Güth and Yaari (1992) (term coined by Güth, 1995). This approach has been used to explain the
existence of a variety of “non-standard” preferences that do not coincide with material payoffs, e.g., altruism,
spite, and reciprocal preferences.1 Typically, the non-materialistic preferences in question convey some form of
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1For example, Bester and Güth (1998), Bolle (2000), and Possajennikov (2000) study combinations of altruism, spite, and
selfishness. Ellingsen (1997) finds that preferences that induce aggressive bargaining can survive in a Nash demand game. Fershtman
and Weiss (1998) study evolution of concerns for social status. Sethi and Somanthan (2001) study the evolution of reciprocity in
the form of preferences that are conditional on the opponent’s preference type. In the context of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Guttman (2003) explores the stability of conditional cooperation. Dufwenberg and Güth (1999) study firm’s preferences
for large sales. Güth and Napel (2006) study preference evolution when players use the same preferences in both ultimatum and
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commitment advantage that induces opponents to behave in a way that benefits individuals with non-materialistic
preferences, as described by Schelling (1960) and Frank (1987). Indeed, Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007)
show that this kind of result is generic.
A crucial feature of the indirect evolutionary approach is that preferences are explicitly or implicitly assumed
to be at least partially observable.2 Consequently the results are vulnerable to the existence of mimics who signal
that they have, say, a preference for cooperation, but actually defect on cooperators, thereby earning the benefits
of having the non-standard preference without having to pay the cost (Samuelson, 2001). The effect of varying
the degree to which preferences can be observed has been investigated by Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001), Ely and
Yilankaya (2001), Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), and Herold and Kuzmics (2009). They confirm that the
degree to which preferences are observed decisively influences the outcome of preference evolution.
Yet, the degree to which preferences are observed is still exogenous in these models. In reality we would
expect both the preferences and the ability to observe or conceal them to be the product of an evolutionary
process.3 This paper provides a first step towards filling in the missing link between evolution of preferences and
evolution of how preferences are concealed, feigned, and detected.4 In our model the ability to observe preferences
and the ability to deceive and induce false beliefs about preferences are endogenously determined by evolution,
jointly with the evolution of preferences. Cognitively more sophisticated players have positive probability of
deceiving cognitively less sophisticated players. Mutual observation of preferences occurs only in matches in
which such deception fails. This setup is general enough to encompass both the standard indirect evolutionary
model where preferences are always observed, and the reverse case in which more sophisticated types always
deceive lower types, as well as all intermediate cases between these two extremes. We find that, generically, only
efficient outcomes can be played in stable population states. Moreover, we define a single number that captures
the effective cost of deception against naive opponents, and show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only
if the gain from a unilateral deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception.
Overview of the Model. As in standard evolutionary game theory we assume an infinite population of
individuals who are uniformly randomly matched to play a symmetric normal form game.5,6 Each individual
has a type, which is a tuple, consisting of a preference component and a cognitive component. The preference
component is identified with a utility function over the set of outcomes (i.e. action profiles). In an extension we
dictator games. Koçkcesen and Ok (2000) investigate survival of more general interdependent preferences in aggregative games.
Friedman and Singh (2009) show that vengefulness may survive if observation has some degree of informativeness. Recently, Norman
(2012) has shown how to adapt some of these results into a dynamic model
2Gamba (2013) is an interesting exception. She assumes play of a self-confirming equilibrium, rather than a Nash equilibrium, in
an extensive-form game. This allows for evolution of non-materialistic preferences even when they are completely unobservable. An
alternative is to allow for a dynamic that is not strictly payoff monotonic. This approach is pursued by Frenkel, Heller, and Teper
(2014), who show that multiple biases (inducing non-materialistic preferences) can survive in non-monotonic evolutionary dynamics
even if they are unobservable, because each approximately compensates for the errors of the others.
3On this topic, Robson and Samuelson (2011) write: “The standard argument is that we can observe preferences because people
give signals – a tightening of the lips or flash of the eyes – that provide clues as to their feelings. However, the emission of such
signals and their correlation with the attendant emotions are themselves the product of evolution. [...] We cannot simply assume
that mimicry is impossible, as we have ample evidence of mimicry from the animal world, as well as experience with humans who
make their way by misleading others as to their feelings, intentions and preferences. [...] In our view, the indirect evolutionary
approach will remain incomplete until the evolution of preferences, the evolution of signals about preferences, and the evolution of
reactions to these signals, are all analysed within the model.” [Emphasis added] (pp. 14–15)
4The recent working paper of Gauer and Kuzmics (2016) presents a different way to endogenising the observability of preferences.
Specifically, they assume that preferences are ex ante uncertain, and that each player may exert a cognitive effort to privately observe
the opponent’s preferences.
5The restriction to symmetric games is essentially without loss of generality as discussed in Remark 1.
6It is known that positive assortative matching is conducive to the evolution of altruistic behaviour (Hines and Maynard Smith,
1979) and non-materialistic preferences even when preferences are perfectly unobservable (Alger and Weibull, 2013; Bergstrom, 1995).
It is also known that finite populations allow for evolution of spiteful behaviours (Schaffer, 1988) and non-materialistic preferences
(Huck and Oechssler, 1999). By assuming that individuals are uniformly randomly matched in an infinite population, we avoid
confounding these effects with the effect of endogenising the degree of observability.
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allow for type-interdependent preferences, which are represented by utility functions that are defined over both
action profiles and the opponent’s type. The cognitive component is simply a natural number representing the
level of cognitive sophistication of the individual.7 The cost of increased cognition is strictly positive.
When two individuals with different cognitive levels are matched, there is positive probability (which may
depend on the cognitive levels of both agents) that the agent with the higher level deceives his opponent. For the
sake of tractability, and in order not to limit the degree to which higher levels may exploit lower levels, we model
a strong form of deception. The deceiver observes the opponent’s preferences perfectly, and is allowed to choose
whatever she wants the deceived party to believe about the deceiver’s intended action choice. A strategy profile
that is consistent with this form of deception is called a deception equilibrium. With the remaining probability (or
with probability one if both agents have the same cognitive level) there is no deception in the match. In this case,
we assume that each player observes the opponent’s preferences, and the individuals play a Nash equilibrium of
the complete information game induced by their preferences.
The state of a population is described by a configuration, consisting of a type distribution and a behaviour
policy. The type distribution is simply a finite support distribution on the set of types. The behaviour policy
specifies a Nash equilibrium for each match without deception, and a deception equilibrium for each match with
deception. In a neutrally stable configuration all incumbents earn the same, and if a small group of mutants enter
they earn weakly less than the incumbents in any focal post-entry state. A focal post-entry state is one in which
the incumbents behave against each other in the same way as before the mutants entered.
Main Results. We say that a profile is efficient if it maximises the sum of fitness payoffs. Theorem 1 shows
that in any stable configuration, any type θ¯ with the highest cognitive level in the incumbent population must
play efficiently when meeting itself. The intuition is that otherwise a highest-type mutant who mimics the play
of θ¯ against all incumbents while playing efficiently against itself would outperform type θ¯ (a novel application
of the “secret handshake” argument due to Robson, 1990).
Next we restrict attention to generic games (i.e. games that result with probability one if fitness payoffs are
independently drawn from a continuous distribution) and obtain our first main result: any stable configuration
must induce efficient play in all matches between all types. The idea of the proof can be briefly sketched
as follows. We first show that any type θ in a stable configuration must play efficiently when meeting itself.
Otherwise a mutant who has the same level as θ and the same utility function as θ, but who plays efficiently
against itself, could invade the population. Next, we show that any two types must play efficiently. The intuition
is that otherwise the average within-group fitness would be higher than the between-group fitness, which implies
instability in the face of small perturbations in the frequency of the types: a type who became slightly more
frequent would have a higher fitness than the other incumbents, and this would move the population away from
the original configuration.
The existing literature (e.g., Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007) has demonstrated that if players perfectly
observe each other’s preferences (or do so with sufficiently high probability), then only efficient outcomes are
stable. As was pointed out above, our model encompasses the limiting case in which it is arbitrarily “cheap and
easy” to deceive the opponent, i.e. the case in which the marginal cost of an additional cognitive level is very
low, and having a slightly higher cognitive level allows a player to deceive the opponent with probability one.
A key contribution of the paper is to show that even when it is cheap and easy to deceive the opponent, the
seemingly mild assumption of perfect observability, and Nash equilibrium behaviour, only among players with the
7The one-dimensional representation of cognitive ability reflects the idea that if one is good at deceiving others, then one is more
likely to be good also at reading others and avoiding being deceived by them. In this paper we simplify this relation by assuming a
perfect correlation between the two abilities, and leave the study of more general relations for future research.
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same cognitive level is enough to ensure that stability implies efficiency.
In order to obtain sufficient conditions for stability we restrict attention to generic games that admit a
“punishment action” that ensures that the opponent achieves strictly less than the symmetric efficient payoff.
For games satisfying this relatively mild requirement we fully characterise stable configurations. We define the
deviation gain of an action profile to be the maximal payoff increase a player may obtain by unilaterally deviating
from this action profile (this gain is zero if and only if the action profile is a Nash equilibrium). Next we define
the effective cost of deception in the environment as the minimal ratio between the cost of an increased cognitive
level and the probability that an agent with this level deceives an opponent with the lowest cognitive level. Our
second main result shows that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if its deviation gain is smaller than the
effective cost of deception. In particular, efficient Nash equilibria are stable in all environments, while non-Nash
efficient outcomes are stable only as long as the gain from a unilateral deviation is sufficiently small.
Next, we note that non-generic games may admit different kinds of stable configurations. One particularly
interesting family of non-generic games is the family of zero-sum games, such as the Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
We analyse this game and characterise a heterogeneous stable population (inspired by a related construction in
Conlisk, 2001) in which different cognitive levels coexist, players with equal levels play the Nash equilibrium, and
players with higher levels beat their opponents but this gain is offset by higher cognitive costs.
Finally, we discuss in Section 3.6 how one might relax the assumption that each agent perfectly observes the
partner’s preferences in matches without deception, and briefly present the implications of this relaxation on our
main results.
Interdependent Preferences. In most of the paper we deal only with “type-neutral” preferences that are
defined only over action profiles. Section 4 extends the analysis to interdependent preferences, i.e. preferences
that may also depend on the opponent’s type. Herold and Kuzmics (2009) study a similar setup while assuming
perfect observability of types among all individuals. Their key result is that any mixed action that gives each
player a payoff above her maxmin payoff can be the outcome of a stable configuration.8
Our main result shows that a pure configuration is stable essentially iff: (1) all incumbents have the same
cognitive level n, (2) the cost of level n is smaller than the difference between the incumbents’ (fitness) payoff
and the minmax/maxmin value, and (3) the deviation gain is smaller than the effective cost of deception against
an opponent with cognitive level n. In particular, if the marginal effective cost of deception is sufficiently small,
then only Nash equilibria can be the outcomes of pure stable configurations, while if the effective cost of deceiving
some cognitive level n is sufficiently high (while the cost of achieving level n is sufficiently low), then essentially
any action profile is the outcome of a pure stable configuration (similar to the result of Herold and Kuzmics,
2009, in the setup without deception). We conclude by characterising stable configurations in the “Hawk-Dove”
game (Section 4.4). We show that such games admit heterogeneous stable configurations in which players with
different levels coexist, each type has preferences that induce cooperation only against itself, and higher types
“exploit” lower types (and this is offset by their higher cognitive cost).
Further Related Literature. There is a large literature in biology and evolutionary psychology on the evo-
lution of the “theory of mind” (Premack and Woodruff, 1979). According to the “Machiavellian intelligence”
8Herold and Kuzmics (2009) expand the framework of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) to include interdependent preferences,
i.e. preferences that depend on the opponent’s preference type. Under perfect or almost perfect observability, if all preferences that
depend on the opponent’s type are considered, then any symmetric outcome above the minmax material payoff is evolutionarily
stable. In our setting a pure profile also has to be a Nash equilibrium in order to be the sole outcome supported by evolutionarily
stable preferences. Herold and Kuzmics (2009) find that non-discriminating preferences (including selfish materialistic preferences)
are typically not evolutionarily stable on their own. By contrast, certain preferences that exhibit discrimination are evolutionarily
stable. Similarly, evolutionary stability requires the presence of discriminating preferences also in our setup.
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hypothesis (Humphrey, 1976) and the “social brain” hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998), the extraordinary cognitive
abilities of humans evolved as a result of the demands of social interactions, rather than the demands of the
natural environment: in a single-person decision problem there is a fixed benefit from being smart, but in a
strategic situation it may be important to be smarter than the opponent. From an evolutionary perspective,
there is a trade-off between the benefit of outsmarting the opponent and the non-negligible costs associated with
increased cognitive capacity (Holloway, 1996; Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall, 1998). Our model incorporates
these features.
There is a smaller literature on the evolution of strategic sophistication within game theory; see, e.g., Stahl
(1993), Banerjee and Weibull (1995), Stennek (2000), Conlisk (2001), Abreu and Sethi (2003), Mohlin (2012),
Rtischev (2016), and Heller (2015). Following these papers, we provide results to the effect that different degrees
of cognitive sophistication may coexist.
Kimborough, Robalino, and Robson (2014) construct a model to demonstrate the advantage of having a theory
of mind (understood as an ability to ascribe stable preferences to other players) over learning by reinforcement.
In novel games the ascribed preferences allow the agents with a theory of mind to draw on past experience
whereas a reinforcement learner without such a model has to start over again. Hopkins (2014) explains why
costly signaling of altruism may be especially valuable for those agents who have a theory of mind.
Robson (1990) initiated a literature on evolution in cheap-talk games by formulating the secret handshake
effect: evolution selects an efficient stable state if mutants can send messages that the incumbents either do not
see or do not benefit from seeing. Against the incumbents a mutant plays the same action as the incumbents
do, but against other mutants the mutant plays an action that is a component of the efficient equilibrium. Thus
the mutants are able to invade unless the incumbents are already playing efficiently. See also the related analysis
in Matsui (1991) and Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001). We allow for deception and still find that efficiency is
necessary (though no longer sufficient) for stability. As pointed out by Wärneryd (1991) and Schlag (1993),
among others, problems arise if either the incumbents use all available messages (so that there is no message left
for the incumbents to coordinate on) or the incumbents follow a strategy that induces the mutants to play an
action that lowers the mutants’ payoffs below those of the incumbents. To circumvent this problem, Kim and
Sobel (1995) use stochastic stability arguments and Wärneryd (1998) uses complexity costs. Similarly, evolution
selects an efficient outcome in our model, where the preferences also serve the function of messages.
Structure. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The results are
presented in Section 3. Section 4 studies type-interdependent preferences. We conclude in Section 5. Appendix
A contains proofs not in the main text. Appendix B formally constructs heterogeneous stable populations in
specific games.
2 Model
We consider a large population of agents, each of whom is endowed with a type that determines her subjective
preferences and her cognitive level. The agents are randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player game.
A dynamic evolutionary process of cultural learning, or biological inheritance, increases the frequency of more
successful types. We present a static solution concept to capture stable population states in such environments.
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2.1 Underlying Game and Types
Consider a symmetric two-player normal form game G with a finite set A of pure actions and a set ∆ (A) of
mixed actions (or strategies). We use the letter a (resp., σ) to describe a typical pure action (resp., mixed action).
Payoffs are given by pi : A× A→ R, where pi (a, a′) is the material (or fitness) payoff to a player using action a
against action a′. The payoff function is extended to mixed actions in the standard way, where pi (σ, σ′) denotes
the material payoff to a player using strategy σ, against an opponent using strategy σ′. With a slight abuse of
notation let a denote the degenerate strategy that puts all the weight on action a. We adopt this convention
for probability distributions throughout the paper. Let p¯i (σ, σ′) := pi (σ, σ′) + pi (σ′, σ) denote the sum of fitness
payoffs when the players play the strategy profile (σ, σ′).
Remark 1. The restriction to symmetric games is without loss of generality when dealing with interactions
in a single population. In cases in which the interaction is asymmetric, it can be captured in our setup (as
is standard in the literature; see, e.g., Selten, 1980, and van Damme, 1987, Section 9.5) by embedding the
asymmetric interaction in a larger, symmetric game in which nature first randomly assigns the players to roles
in the asymmetric interaction. Observe that any mixed action profile in the original game (i.e. any mixed action
of the row player and any mixed action of the column player) corresponds to a mixed action in the embedded
game. Thus, symmetric profiles in the embedded game can capture all profiles in the original game.
We imagine a large population of individuals (technically, a continuum) who are uniformly randomly matched
to play the game G. Each individual i in the population is endowed with a type θ = (u, n) ∈ Θ = U×N, consisting
of preferences, identified with a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, u ∈ U , and cognitive level9 n ∈ N.
Let ∆ (Θ) be the set of all finite support probability distributions on Θ. A population is represented by a finite-
support type distribution µ ∈ ∆ (Θ). We restrict attention to finite-support distributions, partly for reasons
of tractability, and partly because we think of the infinite population as a convenient approximation of a large
but finite population that consists of a finite number of types. Let C (µ) denote the support (carrier) of type
distribution µ ∈ ∆ (Θ). Given a type θ, we use uθ and nθ to refer to its preferences and cognitive level,
respectively.
In the main model we assume that the preferences are defined over action profiles, as in Dekel, Ely, and
Yilankaya (2007).10 This means that any preferences can be represented by a utility function of the form u :
A×A→ R. The set of all possible (modulo affine transformations) utility functions on A×A is U = [0, 1]|A|2 . Let
BRu (σ′) denote the set of best replies to strategy σ′ given preferences u, i.e. BRu (σ′) = arg maxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ′).
There is a fitness cost to increased cognition, represented by a strictly increasing cognitive cost function
k : N→ R+ satisfying limn→∞ k (n) =∞. The fitness payoff of an individual equals the material payoff from the
game, minus the cognitive cost. Let kn denote the cost of having cognitive level n. Hence kθ = knθ denotes the
cost of having type θ. Without loss of generality, we assume that k1 = 0.
2.2 Configurations
A state of the population is described by a type distribution and a behaviour policy for each type in the support
of the type distribution. An individual’s behaviour is assumed to be (subjectively) rational in the sense that it
maximises her subjective preferences given the belief she has about the opponent’s expected behaviour. However,
her beliefs may be incorrect if she is deceived by her opponent. An individual may be deceived if her opponent
is of a strictly higher cognitive level. The probability of deception is given by the function q : N×N→ [0, 1] that
9For tractability, we choose to work with a discrete set of cognitive levels. The main results in the paper can be adapted to a setup
in which the feasible set of cognitive efforts is a continuum, provided that we maintain our focus on finite-support type distributions.
10In Section 4, we study type-interdependent preferences, which depend on the opponent’s type, as in Herold and Kuzmics (2009).
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satisfies q (n, n′) = 0 if and only if n ≤ n′. We interpret q (n, n′) as the probability that a player with cognitive
level n deceives an opponent with cognitive level n′. Specifically, when two players with cognitive levels n′ and
n ≥ n′ are matched to play, then with a probability of q (n, n′) the individual with the higher cognitive level n
(henceforth, the higher type) observes the opponent’s preferences perfectly, and is able to deceive the opponent
(henceforth, the lower type). The deceiver is allowed to choose whatever she wants the deceived party to believe
about the deceiver’s intended action choice. The deceived party best-replies given her possibly incorrect belief.
For simplicity, we assume that if the deceived party has multiple best replies, then the deceiver is allowed to
break indifference, and choose which of the best replies she wants the deceived party to play. Consequently the
deceiver is able to induce the deceived party to play any strategy that is a best reply to some belief about the
opponent’s mixed action, given the deceived party’s preferences.
Given preferences u ∈ U , let Σ (u) denote the set of undominated strategies, which are the set of actions that
are best replies to at least one strategy of the opponent (given the preferences u). Formally, we define
Σ (u) = {σ ∈ ∆ (A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) such that σ ∈ BRu (σ′)} .
We say that a strategy profile is a deception equilibrium if the strategy profile is optimal from the point of view
of player i under the constraint that player j has to play an undominated strategy. Formally:
Definition 1. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ , a strategy profile (σ˜, σ˜′) is a deception equilibrium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(uθ′ )
uθ (σ, σ′) .
Let DE (θ, θ′) be the set of all such deception equilibria.
With the remaining probability of 1 − q (n, n′) − q (n′, n) there is no deception between the players with
cognitive levels n and n′, and they play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by their preferences. Given two
preferences u, u′ ∈ U , let NE (u, u′) ⊆ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) be the set of mixed equilibria of the game induced by the
preferences u and u′, i.e.
NE (u, u′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ)} .
We are now in a position to define our key notion of a configuration, by combining a type distribution with
a behaviour policy, as represented by Nash equilibria and deception equilibria.
Definition 2. A configuration is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆ (Θ) is a type distribution, and b = (bN , bD) is a
behaviour policy, where bN , bD : C (µ)× C (µ) −→ ∆ (A) satisfy for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) :
q (nθ, nθ′) + q (nθ′ , nθ) < 1 ⇒
(
bNθ (θ′) , bNθ′ (θ)
) ∈ NE (θ, θ′) , and
nθ > nθ′ ⇒
(
bDθ (θ′) , bDθ′ (θ)
) ∈ DE (θ, θ′) .
We interpret bDθ (θ′) = bD (θ, θ′) (resp., bNθ (θ′)) to be the strategy used by type θ against type θ′ when deception
occurs (resp., does not occur).
Given a configuration (µ, b) we call the types in the support of µ incumbents. Note that standard arguments
imply that for any type distribution µ, there exists a mapping b : C (µ) × C (µ) −→ ∆ (A) such that (µ, b) is a
configuration. Given a configuration (µ, b) and two incumbent types θ, θ′, let pi (θ, θ′) be the expected fitness of
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an agent with type θ conditional on being matched with θ′:
piθ (θ′| (µ, b)) = (q (nθ, nθ′) + q (nθ′ , nθ)) · pi
(
bDθ (θ′) , bDθ′ (θ)
)
+ (1− (q (nθ, nθ′) + q (nθ′ , nθ))) · pi
(
bNθ (θ′) , bNθ′ (θ)
)
.
The expected fitness of an individual of type θ in configuration (µ, b) is
Πθ|(µ,b) =
∑
θ′∈C(µ)
µ (θ′) · piθ (θ′| (µ, b))− kθ.
When all incumbent types have the same expected fitness, we say that the configuration is balanced.
A number of aspects of our model of cognitive sophistication merit further discussion.
1. Same deception against all lower types: Our model assumes that a player may use different deceptions
against different types with lower cognitive levels. We note that our results remain the same (with minor
changes to the proofs) in an alternative setup in which individuals have to use the same mixed action in
their deception efforts towards all opponents.
2. Unidimensional cognitive ability: In reality the ability to deceive and the ability to detect preferences
are probably not identical. However, both of them are likely to be strongly related to cognitive ability
in general, and more specifically to theory of mind and the ability to entertain higher-order intentional
attitudes (Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall, 1998; Dunbar, 1998). For this reason we believe that a
unidimensional cognitive trait is a reasonable approximation. Moreover, it is an approximation that affords
us necessary tractability. We connect the abilities to detect and conceal preferences with the ability to
deceive, by assuming (throughout the paper) that one is able to deceive one’s opponent if and only if one
observes the opponent’s preferences and conceals one’s own preferences from the opponent.
3. Power of deception: Our definition of deception equilibrium amounts to an assumption that a successful
deception attempt allows the deceiver to implement her favourite strategy profile, under the constraint that
the deceived party does not choose a dominated action from her point of view. Moreover, we assume that a
player with a higher cognitive level knows whether her deception was successful when choosing her action.
These assumptions give higher cognitive types a clear advantage over lower cognitive types. Hence, in an
alternative model in which successful deceivers have less deception power, we would expect the evolutionary
advantage of higher types to be weaker than in our current model. Below we find that (for generic games)
in any stable state everyone plays the same efficient action profile and has the lowest cognitive level.11 We
infer that these states will remain stable also in a model where successful deception is less powerful. We
leave for future research the analysis of feasible but less powerful deception technologies.
4. Non-Bayesian deception: Note that a successful deceiver is able to induce the opponent to believe that
the deceiving type will play any mixed action σˆ, even an action that is never played by any agent in the
population. That is, deception is so powerful in our model that the deceived opponent is not able to apply
Bayesian reasoning in his false assessment of which action the agent is going to play. We think of this
assumption as describing a setting in which the deceiver (of a higher cognitive type) is able to provide a
convincing argument (tell a convincing story) that she is going to play σˆ. From a Bayesian perspective
one might object that these arguments are signals that should be used to update beliefs. To this we
would respond that the stories told to a potential victim by different deceivers will vary across would-
be deceivers, even across would-be deceivers with the same preferences. Hence no individual will ever
11Thus, in our setup a cognitive arms race (i.e. Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis a` la Humphrey, 1976; Robson, 2003) is a
non-equilibrium phenomenon, or alternatively a feature of non-generic games (or requires type-interdependent preferences).
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accumulate a database containing more than one or a handful of similar arguments. The limited amount of
data on similar arguments will preclude the efficient use of Bayesian updating for inferring likely behaviour
following different arguments. We are not aware of the existence of a Bayesian model of deception that is
satisfactory for our purposes. We leave the development of such a Bayesian model to future research.
5. Observation and Nash equilibrium behaviour in the case of non-deception: It is difficult to avoid an element
of arbitrariness when making an assumption about what is being observed when neither party is able to
deceive the other. As in most of the existing literature on the indirect evolutionary approach (e.g., Güth
and Yaari, 1992; Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, Section 3), we assume that when there is no deception,
then there is perfect observability of the opponent’s preferences. In Section 3.6 we discuss the implications
of the relaxation of this assumption. We consider it to be an important contribution of our analysis that
it highlights the critical importance of the assumption made regarding observability, and the resulting
behaviour, in matches without deception.
We further assume that if two agents observe each other’s preferences then they play a Nash equilibrium of
the complete information game induced by their preferences. This assumption is founded on the common
idea that when agents are not deceived, then (1) over time they adapt their beliefs (in a way that is consistent
with Bayesian inference) about the distribution of actions they face, conditional on their partners’ observed
preferences, and (2) they best-reply given their belief about their current partner’s distribution of actions.
By contrast, as discussed above, when agents are deceived they are unable to correctly update the their
beliefs about their partner’s action (i.e. unable to use Bayesian inference to arrive at beliefs about the
opponent’s distribution of actions). Still, they are able to best-reply given their (possibly false) beliefs
about the deceiver’s action.
2.3 Evolutionary Stability
Recall that a neutrally stable strategy (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982) is a strategy
that, if played by most of the population, weakly outperforms any other strategy. Similarly, an evolutionarily
stable strategy is a strategy that, if played by most of the population, strictly outperforms any other strategy.
Definition 3. A strategy σ ∈ ∆ (A) is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if for every σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) there is some
ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if ε ∈ (0, ε¯), then p˜i (σ′, (1− ε)σ + εσ′) ≤ p˜i (σ, (1− ε)σ + εσ′). If weak inequality is replaced
by strict inequality for each σ′ 6= σ, then σ is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
We extend the notions of neutral and evolutionary stability from strategies to configurations. We begin by
defining the type game that is induced by a configuration.
Definition 4. For any configuration (µ, b) the corresponding type game Γ(µ,b) is the symmetric two-player game
where each player’s strategy space is C (µ), and the payoff to strategy θ, against θ′, is piθ (θ′| (µ, b))− kθ.
The definition of a type game allows us to apply notions and results from standard evolutionary game
theory, where evolution acts upon strategies, to the present setting where evolution acts upon types. A similar
methodology was used in Mohlin (2012). Note that each type distribution with support in C (µ) is represented
by a mixed strategy in Γ(µ,b).
We want to capture robustness with respect to small groups of individuals, henceforth called mutants, who
introduce new types and new behaviours into the population. Suppose that a fraction ε of the population is
replaced by mutants and suppose that the distribution of types within the group of mutants is µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ).
Consequently the post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ε) ·µ+ ε ·µ′. That is, for each type θ ∈ C (µ)∪C (µ′),
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µ˜ (θ) = (1− ε) · µ (θ) + ε · µ′ (θ). In line with most of the literature on the indirect evolutionary approach we
assume that adjustment of behaviour is infinitely faster than adjustment of type distribution.12 Thus we assume
that the post-entry type distribution quickly stabilises into a configuration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. There may exist many such
post-entry type configurations, all having the same type distribution, but different behaviour policies. We note
that incumbents do not have to adjust their behaviour against other incumbents in order to continue playing
Nash equilibria, and deception equilibria, among themselves. For this reason, we assume (similarly to Dekel, Ely,
and Yilankaya, 2007, in the setup with perfect observability) that the incumbents maintain the same pre-entry
behaviour among themselves. Formally:
Definition 5. Let (µ, b) and
(
µ˜, b˜
)
be two configurations such that C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜). We say that (µ˜, b˜) is focal
(with respect to (µ, b)) if θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) implies that b˜Dθ (θ′) = bDθ (θ′) and b˜Nθ (θ′) = bNθ (θ′).
Standard fixed-point arguments imply that for every configuration (µ, b) and every type distribution µ˜ satis-
fying C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜) , there exists a behaviour policy b˜ such that (µ˜, b˜) is a focal configuration.
Our stability notion requires that the incumbents outperform all mutants in all configurations that are focal
relative to the initial configuration.
Definition 6. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC) if, for every µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ), there
is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯), it holds that if (µ˜, b˜), where µ˜ = (1− ε) · µ + ε · µ′, is a focal
configuration, then µ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜). The configuration (µ, b) is an evolutionarily stable
configuration (ESC) if the same conditions imply that µ is an ESS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜) for each µ
′ 6= µ.
We conclude this section by discussing a few issues related to our notion of stability.
1. In line with existing notions of evolutionary stability in the literature (in particular, the notions of Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, and Alger and Weibull, 2013), we require the mutants to be outperformed in all
focal configurations (rather than requiring them to be outperformed in at least one focal configuration).
This reflects the assumption that the population converges to a new post-entry equilibrium in a decentralised
(possibly random) way that may lead to any of the post-entry focal configurations. Thus the incumbents
cannot coordinate their post-entry play on a specific focal configuration that favors them.
2. In order to be consistent with the standard definition of neutral stability, we require the incumbents to
earn weakly more than the average payoff of the mutants. We note that all of our results remain the same
if one uses an alternative weaker definition that requires the incumbents to earn weakly more than the
worst-performing mutant.
3. The main stability notion that we use in the paper is NSC. The stronger notion of ESC is not useful in
our main model because there always exist equivalent types that have slightly different preferences (as the
set of preferences is a continuum) and induce the same behaviour as the incumbents. Such mutants always
achieve the same fitness as the incumbents in post-entry configurations, and thus ESCs never exist. Note
that the stability notions in Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and Alger and Weibull (2013) are also based
on neutral stability.13 In Section 4 we study a variant of the model in which the preferences may depend
also on the opponent’s types. This allows for the existence of ESCs.
4. Observe that Def. 6 implies internal stability with respect to small perturbations in the frequencies of the
incumbent types (because when µ′ = µ, then µ is required to be an NSS in Γ(µ,b)). By standard arguments,
internal stability implies that any NSC is balanced: all incumbent types obtain the same fitness.
12Sandholm (2001) and Mohlin (2010) are exceptions.
13In their stability analysis of homo hamiltonensis preferences Alger and Weibull (2013) disregard mutants who are behaviourally
indistinguishable from homo hamiltonensis upon entry.
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5. By simple adaptations of existing results in the literature, one can show that NSCs and ESCs are dy-
namically stable. NSCs are Lyapunov stable: no small change in the population composition can lead it
away from µ in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜), if types evolve according to the replicator dynamic (Thomas, 1985;
Bomze and Weibull, 1995). ESCs are also asymptotically stable: populations starting out close enough
to µ eventually converge to µ in Γ(µ˜,b˜) if types evolve according to a smooth payoff-monotonic selection
dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Cressman, 1997; Sandholm, 2010).
6. The stability notions of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and Alger and Weibull (2013) consider only
monomorphic groups of mutants (i.e. mutants all having the same type). We additionally consider stability
against polymorphic groups of mutants (as do Herold and Kuzmics, 2009). One advantage of our approach
is that it allows us to use an adaptation of the well-known notion of ESS, which immediately implies
dynamic stability and internal stability, whereas Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) have to introduce a
novel notion of stability without these properties. Remark 2 below discusses the influence on our results of
using an alternative definition that deals only with monomorphic mutants.
3 Results
3.1 Preliminary Definitions
Define the deviation gain of action a ∈ A, denoted by g (a) ∈ R+, as the maximal gain a player can get by playing
a different action in a population in which everyone plays a:
g (a) = max
a′∈A
pi (a′, a)− pi (a, a) .
Note that g (a) = 0 iff (a, a) is a Nash equilibrium.
Define the effective cost of deception in the environment, denoted by c ∈ R+, as the minimal ratio between
the cognitive cost and the probability of deceiving an opponent of cognitive level one:14
c = min
n≥2
kn
q (n, 1) .
We say that a strategy profile is efficient if it maximises the sum of fitness payoffs. Formally:
Definition 7. A strategy profile (σ, σ′) is efficient in the game G = (A, pi) if pi (σ, σ′) + pi (σ′, σ) ≥ pi (a, a′) +
pi (a′, a), for each action profile (a, a′) ∈ A2.
A pure Nash equilibrium (a, a) is strict if pi (a, a) > pi (a′, a) for all a′ 6= a ∈ A. Let pˆi = maxa,a′∈A (0.5 · p¯i (a, a′))
denote the efficient payoff, i.e. the average payoff achieved by players who play an efficient profile.
An action a is a punishment action if playing it guarantees that the opponent will obtain less than the efficient
payoff, i.e. pi (a′, a) < pˆi for each a′ ∈ A. Some of our results below assume that the underlying game admits a
punishment action.15
Given a configuration (µ, b) let n¯ = maxθ∈C(µ) nθ denote the maximal cognitive level of the incumbents. We
refer to incumbents with this cognitive level as the highest types.
14The minimum in the definition of c is well defined for the following reason. Let nˆ be a number such that knˆ > k2p(2,1) (such a
number exists because limn→∞ kn = ∞). Observe that knp(n,1) ≥ kn > k2p(2,1) for any n ≥ nˆ. This implies that there is an n¯ such
that 2 ≤ n¯ ≤ nˆ and n¯ = argminn≥2 knp(n,1) .
15If we add to a generic underlying game a pure action that is equivalent to playing the mixed action that minimises the opponent’s
payoff, then this newly added action is a punishment action.
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A deception equilibrium is fitness maximising if it maximises the fitness of the higher type in the match (under
the restriction that the lower type plays an action that is not dominated, given her preferences). Formally:
Definition 8. Let θ, θ′ be types with nθ > nθ′ . A deception equilibrium (σ˜, σ˜′) is fitness maximising if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A), σ′∈Σ(uθ′ )
pi (σ, σ′) .
Let FMDE (θ, θ′) ⊆ DE (θ, θ′) denote the set of all such fitness-maximising deception equilibria of two types
θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ . Note that FMDE (θ, θ′) might be an empty set (if there is no action profile that maximises
both the fitness and the subjective utility of the higher type).
A configuration is pure if everyone plays the same action. Formally:
Definition 9. A configuration (µ, b) is pure if there exists a∗ ∈ A such that for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) it holds that
bNθ (θ′) = a∗ whenever q (θ, θ′) < 1, and bDθ (θ′) = a∗ whenever q (θ, θ′) > 0 . With a slight abuse of notation we
denote such a pure configuration by (µ, a∗), and we refer to b ≡ a∗ as the outcome of the configuration.
In order to simplify the notation and the arguments in the proofs, we assume throughout this section that
the underlying game admits at least three actions (i.e. |A| ≥ 3). The results could be extended to games with
two actions, but it would make the notation more cumbersome and the proofs less instructive.
3.2 Characterisation of the Highest Types’ Behaviour
In this section we characterise the behaviour of an incumbent type, θ¯ = (u, n¯), which has the highest level of
cognition in the population.16 We show that the behaviour satisfies the following three conditions:
1. Type θ¯ plays an efficient action profile when meeting itself.
2. Type θ¯ maximises its fitness in all deception equilibria.
3. Any opponent with a lower cognitive level achieves at most pˆi against type θ¯.
Theorem 1. Let (µ∗, b∗)be an NSC, and let θ, θ¯ ∈ C (µ∗). Then: (1) if nθ¯ = n¯ then pi
(
θ¯, θ¯
)
= pˆi; (2) if
nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then
(
bD
θ¯
(θ) , bDθ
(
θ¯
)) ∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ); and (3) if nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then pi (θ, θ¯) ≤ pˆi.
Proof Sketch (formal proof in Appendix A.2). The proof utilises mutants (denoted by θ1, θ2, θ3, and θˆ, below)
with the highest cognitive level n¯ and with a specific kind of utility function, called indifferent and pro-generous,
that makes a player indifferent between all her own actions, but which makes the player prefer that the opponent
choose an action that allows the player to obtain the highest possible fitness payoff.
To prove part 1 of the theorem, assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
< pˆi. Let a1, a2 ∈ A be any
two actions such that (a1, a2) is an efficient action profile (i.e. 0.5 · (pi (a1, a2) + pi (a1, a2)) = pˆi). Consider three
different mutant types θ1, θ2, and θ3, which are of the highest cognitive level that is present in the population,
and have indifferent and pro-generous utility functions. Suppose equal fractions of these three mutant types enter
the population. There is a focal post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep playing their pre-entry
play among themselves, the mutants play the same Nash equilibria as the incumbent θ¯ against all incumbent
types (and the incumbents behave against the mutants in the same way they behave against θ¯), the mutants
16For tractability we assume that a configuration can have only finite support. Note, however, that there is some sufficiently high
cognitive level n such that kn > maxa,a′∈A pi (a, a′). As a result, even if one relaxes the assumption of finite support, any NSC must
include only a finite number of cognitive levels, also without the finite-support assumption.
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play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against all lower types, and when mutants of type θi are matched
with mutants of type θ(i+1)mod 3 they play the efficient profile (a1, a2). In such a focal post-entry configuration
all mutants earn a weakly higher fitness than θ¯ against the incumbents, and a strictly higher fitness against the
mutants. This implies that (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
To prove part 2, assume to the contrary that
(
bD
θ¯
(θ) , bDθ
(
θ¯
)) 6∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ). Suppose mutants of type
θˆ enter. Consider a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep playing their pre-entry play among
themselves, and the mutants mimic the play of θ¯, except that they play fitness-maximising deception equilibria
against all lower types. The mutants obtain a weakly higher payoff than θ¯ against all types, and a strictly higher
payoff than θ¯ against at least one lower type. Thus (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
To prove part 3, assume to the contrary that pi
(
θ, θ¯
)
> pˆi. This implies that against type θ¯, type θ earns more
than pˆi in either the deception equilibrium or the Nash equilibrium. Suppose mutants of type θˆ enter. Consider
a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep playing their pre-entry play among themselves, while
the mutants: (i) play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against lower types, (ii) mimic type θ’s play in the
Nash/deception equilibrium against type θ¯ in which θ earns more than pˆi, and (iii) mimic the play of θ¯ in all
other interactions. The type θˆ mutants earn strictly more than θ¯ against both θˆ and θ¯. The mutants earn weakly
more than θ¯ against all other types. This implies that (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
Remark 2. The first part of Theorem 1 (a highest type must play an efficient strategy when meeting itself) is
similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya’s (2007) Proposition 2, which shows that only efficient outcomes can be
stable in a setup with perfect observability and no deception. We should note that Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya
(2007) use a weaker notion of efficiency. An action is efficient in the sense of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)
(DEY-efficient) if its fitness is the highest among the symmetric strategy profiles (i.e. action a is DEY-efficient
if pi (a, a) ≥ pi (σ, σ) for all strategies σ ∈ ∆ (A)). Observe that our notion of efficiency (Definition 7) implies
DEY-efficiency, but the converse is not necessarily true. The weaker notion of DEY-efficiency is the relevant one
in the setup of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), because they consider only monomorphic groups mutants; i.e.
all mutants who enter at the same time are of the same type. A similar result would also hold in our setup if we
imposed a similar limitation on the set of feasible mutants. However, without such a limitation, heterogeneous
mutants can correlate their play, and our stronger notion of efficiency is required to characterise stability.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that a game that has only asymmetric profiles that are efficient does
not admit any NSCs.
Corollary 1. If G does not have an efficient profile that is symmetric (i.e. if pi (a, a) < pˆi for each a ∈ A), then
the game does not admit an NSC.
Remark 3. We note that essentially all interactions admit efficient symmetric profiles. As discussed in Remark 1,
any interaction (symmetric or asymmetric) can be embedded in a larger, symmetric game in which nature first
randomly assigns roles to the players, and then each player chooses an action given his assigned role.17 Observe
that such an embedded game always admits an efficient symmetric action profile. In particular, if the efficient
asymmetric profile in the original game is (a, a′), then the efficient symmetric profile in the embedded game is
the one in which each player plays a as the row player and a′ as the column player.
17If the original game is symmetric, the role (i.e. being either the row or the column player) can be interpreted as reflecting some
observable payoff-irrelevant asymmetry between the two players.
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3.3 Characterisation of Pure NSCs
In this subsection we characterise pure NSCs, i.e. stable configurations in which everyone plays the same pure
action in every match. Such a configuration may be viewed as representing the state of a population that has
settled on a convention that there is a unique correct way to behave. We begin by showing that in a pure NSC
all incumbents have the minimal cognitive level, since having a higher ability does not yield any advantage when
everyone plays the same action.
Lemma 1. If (µ, a∗) is an NSC, and (u, n) ∈ C (µ), then n = 1.
Proof. Since all players earn the same game payoff of pi (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same cognitive cost,
or else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced (which would contradict that (µ, a∗)
is an NSC). Moreover, this uniform cognitive level must be level 1. Otherwise a mutant of a lower level, who
strictly prefers to play a∗ against all actions, would strictly outperform the incumbents in nearby post-entry focal
configurations.
The following proposition shows that a pure outcome is stable iff it is efficient and its deviation gain is smaller
than than the effective cost of deception. Formally:
Proposition 1. Let a∗ be an action in a game that admits a punishment action. The following two statements
are equivalent:
(a) There exists a type distribution µ such that (µ, a∗) is an NSC.
(b) a∗ satisfies the following two conditions: (1) pi (a∗, a∗) = pˆi, and (2) g (a∗) ≤ c.
Proof.
1. “If side.” Assume that (a∗, a∗) is an efficient profile and that g (a∗) ≤ c. Let a˜ be a punishment action.
Consider a monomorphic configuration (µ, a∗) consisting of type θ∗ = (u∗, 1) where all incumbents are of
cognitive level 1 and of the same preference type u∗, according to which all actions except a∗ and a˜ are
strictly dominated, a˜ weakly dominates a∗, and a∗ is a best reply to itself:
u∗ (a, a′) =

1 if a = a˜ and a′ 6= a∗
0 if a = a∗ or (a = a˜ and a′ = a∗.)
−1 otherwise.
Consider first mutants with cognitive level one. Observe that in any post-entry configuration mutants with
cognitive level one earns at most pˆi when they are matched with the incumbents, and strictly less than pˆi
if the mutants play any action a 6= a∗ with positive probability against the incumbents. Further observe,
that the mutants can earn (on average) at most pˆi when they are matched with other mutants (because pˆi
is the efficient payoff). This implies that incumbents weakly outperform any mutants with cognitive level
one in any post-entry population.
Next, consider mutants with a higher cognitive level n > 1. Such mutants can earn at most pˆi + g (a∗)
when they deceive the incumbents and at most pˆi when they do not deceive the incumbents (recall that
pi (a˜, a˜) + g (a˜) = maxa′pi (a′, a˜) < pˆi because a˜ is a punishment action). Thus the mutants are weakly
outperformed by the incumbents if
q (n, 1) · (g (a∗) + pˆi) + (1− q (n, 1)) · pˆi − kn ≤ pˆi ⇔ g (a∗) ≤ kn
q (n, 1) .
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This holds for all n if g (a∗) ≤ c. The probability of deceiving the incumbents is at most knc . The fact that
g (a∗) ≤ c implies that the average payoff of the mutants against the incumbents is less than pˆi + kn, and
thus if the mutants are sufficiently rare they are weakly outperformed (due to paying the cognitive cost of
kn). We conclude that (µ, a∗) is an NSC.
2. “Only if side.” Assume that (µ, a∗) is an NSC. Theorem 1 implies that pi (a∗, a∗) = pˆi. Assume that
g (a∗) > c. The definition of the effective cost of deception implies that there exists a cognitive level n such
that knq(n,1) < g (a∗). Lemma 1 implies that all the incumbents have cognitive level 1. Consider mutants with
cognitive level n and completely indifferent preferences (i.e. preferences that induce indifference between
all action profiles). Let a′ be a best reply against a∗. There is a post-entry focal configuration in which
(i) the incumbents play a∗ against the mutants, (ii) the mutants play a′ when they deceive an incumbent
opponent and a∗ when they do not deceive an incumbent opponent, and (iii) the mutants play a∗ when
they are matched with another mutant. Note that the mutants achieve at least pˆi + g (a∗) · q (n, 1) when
they are matched against the incumbents. The gain relative to incumbents, g (a∗) · q (n, 1), outweighs their
additional cognitive cost of kn, by our assumption that g (a∗) > c. Thus the mutants strictly outperform
the incumbents.
3.4 Characterisation of NSCs in Generic Games
In this section we characterise NSCs in generic games, by which we mean games in which any two different action
profiles each give the same player a different payoff, and each yield a different sum of payoffs.
Definition 10. A (symmetric) game is generic if for each a, a′, b, b′ ∈ A, {a, a′} 6= {b, b′} implies
pi (a, a′) 6= pi (b, b′) , and pi (a, a′) + pi (a′, a) 6= pi (b, b′) + pi (b′, b) .
For example, if the entries of the payoff matrix pi are drawn independently from a continuous distribution on
an open subset of the real numbers, then the induced game is generic with probability one.
Note that a generic game admits at most one efficient action profile. From Corollary 1 we know that if the
game does not have a symmetric efficient profile then it does not admit any NSC. Hence we can restrict attention
to games with exactly one efficient action profile. Let a¯ denote the action played in this unique profile.
Next we present our main result: all incumbent types play efficiently in any NSC of a generic game.
Theorem 2. If (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC of a generic game with a (unique) efficient outcome (a¯, a¯), then b∗ ≡ a¯, for
all θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗); i.e. all types play the pure action a¯ in all matches.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that configuration (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC such that there are some θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) such
that bNθ (θ′) 6= a¯ and q (θn, θn′) + q (θn′ , θn) < 1, or bDθ (θ′) 6= a¯ and q (θn, θn′) > 0. Let θ˚ be the type with the
highest cognitive level among the types that satisfy at least one of the following conditions:
(A) θ˚ plays inefficiently against itself, i.e. pi
(
θ˚, θ˚
)
< pˆi.
(B) θ˚ and an opponent with a weakly higher type play an inefficient strategy profile, i.e. 0.5·
(
pi
(
θ˚, θ′
)
+ pi
(
θ′, θ˚
))
<
pˆi for some θ′ 6= θ˚ with nθ˚ ≤ nθ′ .
(C) A strictly lower type earns strictly more than pˆi against θ˚, i.e. pi
(
θ′, θ˚
)
> pˆi for some θ′′ 6= θ˚ with nθ˚ > nθ′′ .
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We will now successively rule out each of these cases.
Assume first that (A) holds. Let uˆ be a utility function that is identical to uθ˚ except that: (i) the payoff
of the outcome (a¯, a¯) is increased by the minimal amount required to make it a best reply to itself, and (ii)
the payoff of some other outcome is altered slightly (to ensure uˆ is not already an incumbent) in a way that
does not change the behaviour of agents. (The formal definition of uˆ is provided in Appendix A.3.) Suppose
that mutants of type θˆ = (uˆ, nθ) invade the population. Consider a focal post-entry configuration in which the
mutants mimic the play of the type θ˚ incumbents in all matches except that: (i) the mutants play the efficient
profile (a¯, a¯) among themselves (which yields a higher payoff than what θ¯ achieves when matched against θ˚), and
(ii) when the mutants face a higher type they play either (a¯, a¯) or the same deception/Nash equilibrium that the
higher types play against θ¯. It follows that the mutants θˆ earn a strictly higher payoff than θ˚ against θˆ, and a
weakly higher fitness than type θ against all other types. Thus the mutants strictly outperform the incumbents,
which contradicts the assumption that (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC. The full technical details of this argument are given
in Appendix A.3.
Next, assume that case (B) holds and that case (A) does not hold. This implies that
0.5 ·
(
pi
(
θ˚, θ′
)
+ pi
(
θ′, θ˚
))
< pˆi = pi
(
θ˚, θ˚
)
= pi (θ′, θ′) .
That is, in the subpopulation that includes types θ˚ and θ′ the within-type matchings yield higher payoffs than
out-group matchings (an average payoff of less than pˆi). The following formal argument shows that this property
implies dynamic instability. The fact that (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC implies that µ∗ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ∗,b∗).
Let B be the payoff matrix of the type game Γ(µ∗,b∗) and let n = |C (µ∗)|. It is well known (e.g., Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1988, Exercise 6.4.3, and Hofbauer, 2011, pp. 1–2) that an interior Nash equilibrium of a normal-form
game is an NSS if and only if the payoff matrix is negative semi-definite with respect to the tangent space, i.e.
if and only if xTBx ≤ 0 for each x ∈ Rn such that∑i xi = 0. Assume without loss of generality that type θ˚ (θ′)
is represented by the jth (kth) row of the matrix B. Let the column vector x be defined as follows: x (j) = 1,
x (k) = −1, and x (i) = 0 for each i /∈ {j, k}. That is, the vector x has all entries equal to zero, except for the
jth entry, which is equal to 1, and the kth entry, which is equal to −1. We have
xTBx = Bjj −Bkj −Bjk +Bkk
= pi (a¯, a¯)− knθ˚ + pi (a¯, a¯)− knθ′ −
(
pi
(
bθ˚ (θ
′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
− knθ˚ + pi
(
bθ′
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚ (θ
′)
)
− knθ′
)
= 2 · pi (a¯, a¯)−
(
pi
(
bθ˚ (θ
′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
+ pi
(
bθ′
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚ (θ
′)
))
> 0.
Thus B is not negative semi-definite.
Finally, assume that only case (C) holds. Let θ¯ be an incumbent type with the highest cognitive level. The
fact that case (B) does not hold implies that pi
(
θ¯, θ˚
)
= pi
(
θ˚, θ¯
)
= pˆi. The fact that case (C) holds implies that
pi
(
θ′′, θ˚
)
> pˆi, which implies that type θ˚ has an undominated action that can yield a deceiving opponent a payoff
of more than pˆi in a deception equilibrium. This contradicts part (2) of Theorem 1, according to which we should
have
(
bD
θ¯
(
θ˚
)
, bD
θ˚
(
θ¯
))
= FMDE
(
θ¯, θ˚
)
.
We have shown that no type in the population satisfies either (A), (B), or (C). The fact that no type satisfies
(A) implies that in any match of agents of the same type both agents play action a¯, and the fact that no type
satisfies (B) implies that in any match between two agents of different types both players play action a¯.
Combining the results of this section with the above characterisation of pure NSCs yields the following
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corollary, which fully characterises the NSCs of generic games that admit punishment actions.
Corollary 2. Let G be a generic game that admits a punishment action. The environment admits an NSC iff
there exists an efficient symmetric pure profile (a∗, a∗) satisfying g (a∗) ≤ c (i.e. the deviation gain is smaller
than the effective cost of deception). Moreover, if (µ, b) is an NSC, then b ≡ a∗, and n = 1 for all (u, n) ∈ C (µ).
Remark 4. Corollary 2 shows that generic games do not admit NSCs if the effective cost of deception is smaller
than the deviation gain of the efficient profile. In such cases we conjecture that the behaviour will move in a
never-ending cycle between periods in which the population plays the efficient profile and periods in which it plays
inefficient profiles. We leave the formal analysis to future research (see the related analysis of cyclic behaviour
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with cheap talk and material preferences in Wiseman and Yilankaya, 2001).
Remark 5. Corollary 2 assumes that the underlying game admits a punishment action a˜, that gives an opponent
a payoff strictly smaller than the efficient payoff pˆi, regardless of the opponent’s play. This punishment action is
used in the construction of the NSC that induces the efficient action a∗. Specifically, a non-deceived incumbent
plays the punishment action a′ against any mutant who does not always plays action a∗. If the game does not
admit a punishment action, then (1) a complicated game-specific construction of the way in which incumbents
behave against mutants who do not always play a∗ may be required to support the efficient action as the outcome
of an NSC, and (2) this construction may require further restrictions on the effective cost of deception, in addition
to g (a∗) ≤ c. We leave the study of these issues to future research.
3.5 Non-Pure NSCs in Non-generic Games
The previous two subsections fully characterises (i) pure NSCs and (ii) NSCs in generic games. In this section
we analyse non-pure NSCs in non-generic games. Non-generic games may be of interest in various setups, such
as: (1) normal-form representation of generic extensive-form games (the induced matrix is typically non-generic),
and (2) interesting families of games, such as zero-sum games. Unlike generic games, non-generic games can
admit NSCs that are not pure and that may therefore contain multiple cognitive levels. To demonstrate this we
consider the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, with the following payoff matrix:
R P S
R 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
P 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
S −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
.
To simplify the analysis and the notations we assume in this subsection that a player always succeeds in
deceiving an opponent with a lower cognitive level, i.e. that q (n, n′) = 1 whenever n 6= n′. The analysis can be
extended to the more general setup.
The result below shows that, under mild assumptions on the cognitive cost function, this game admits an NSC
in which all players have the same materialistic preferences, but players of different cognitive levels coexist, and
non-Nash profiles are played in all matches between two individuals of different cognitive levels. More precisely,
when individuals of different cognitive levels meet, the higher-level individual deceives the lower-level individual
into taking a pure action that the higher-level individual then best-replies to. Thus the higher-level individual
earns 1 and her opponent earns −1. Individuals of the same cognitive level play the unique Nash equilibrium.
This means that higher-level types will obtain a payoff of 1 more often than lower-level types, and lower-level
types will obtain a payoff of −1 more often than higher-level types. In the NSC this payoff difference is offset
exactly by the higher cognitive cost paid by the higher types. Moreover, the cognitive cost is increasing and
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unbounded such that at some point the cost of cognition outweighs any payoff differences that may arise from
the underlying game. This implies that there is an upper bound on the cognitive sophistication in the population.
Proposition 2. Let G be a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Let upi denote the (materialistic) preference such that
upi (a, a′) = pi (a, a′) for all profiles (a, a′). Assume that q (n, n′) = 1 whenever n 6= n′. Further assume that the
marginal cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing, so that (a) there is an N such that kN ≤ 2 < kN+1, and
(b) it holds that 1 > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N . Under these assumptions there exists an NSC (µ∗, b∗) such that
C (µ∗) ⊆ {(upi, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed (i.e. |C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of the incumbent types is as follows:
if the individuals in a match are of different cognitive levels, then the higher level plays Paper and the lower level
plays Rock; if both individuals in a match are of the same cognitive level, then they both play the unique Nash
equilibrium (i.e. randomise uniformly over the three actions).
Appendix B.2 contains a formal proof of this result and relates it to a similar construction in Conlisk (2001).
3.6 Robustness Analysis: Partial Observability When There Is No Deception
As mentioned above, our basic model assumes perfect observability, and Nash equilibrium behaviour, in matches
without deception. In what follows we briefly describe the results of a robustness check that relaxes the first of
these two assumptions. For brevity, we detail the full technical analysis in a separate supplementary appendix
(Heller and Mohlin, 2017b).
Specifically, we follow Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and assume that in matches without deception, each
player privately observes the opponent’s type with an exogenous probability p, and with the remaining probability
observes an uninformative signal. This general model extends both our baseline model (where p = 1) and Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya’s (2007) model (which can be viewed as assuming arbitrarily high deception costs).
The main results of the baseline model (p = 1) show that (1) only efficient profiles can be NSCs, and (2) there
exist non-Nash efficient NSCs, provided that the cost of defection is sufficiently large. Our analysis shows that
the former result (namely, stability implies efficiency) is robust to the introduction of partial observability: (1) a
somewhat weaker notion of efficiency is satisfied by the behaviour of the incumbents with the highest cognitive
level in any NSC for any p > 0, and (2) in games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we show that only the efficient
profile can be the outcome of an NSC.
On the other hand, our analysis shows that our second main result (namely, the stability of non-Nash efficient
outcomes) is not robust to the introduction of partial observability. Specifically, we show that: (1) non-Nash
efficient profiles cannot be NSC outcomes for any p < 1 in games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, even when the
effective cost of deception is arbitrarily large; and (2) non-Nash efficient outcomes cannot be pure NSC outcomes
in all games. If a game admits a profile that is both efficient and Nash, then the profile is an NSC outcome for
any p ∈ [0, 1]. If the underlying game does not admit such a profile, then our results show that the environment
does not admit a pure NSC for any p ∈ (0, 1), and that games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma do not admit any
NSC. This suggests that in order to study stability in such environments one might need to apply weaker solution
concepts or to follow a dynamic (rather than static) approach.
4 Type-interdependent Preferences
In this section we describe an extension of our baseline model, such that the preferences may depend not only
on action profiles, but also on the opponent’s type.
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4.1 Changes to the Baseline Model
We briefly describe how to amend the model to handle type-interdependent preferences. Our construction is
similar to that of Herold and Kuzmics (2009).
When the preferences of a type depend on the opponent’s type, we can no longer work with the set of all
possible preferences, because it would create problems of circularity and cardinality.18 Instead, we must restrict
attention to a pre-specified set of feasible preferences. We begin by defining ΘID as an arbitrary set of labels.
Each label is a pair θ = (u, n) ∈ ΘID, where n ∈ N and u is a type-interdependent utility function that depends
on the played action profile as well as the opponent’s label, u : A×A×ΘID → R.
Each label θ = (u, n) may now be interpreted as a type. The definition of u extends to mixed actions in the
obvious way. We use the label u also to describe its associated utility function u. Thus u (σ, σ′, θ′) denotes the
subjective payoff that a player with preferences u earns when she plays strategy σ against an opponent with type
θ′ who plays strategy σ′.
Let UID denote the set of all preferences that are part of some type in ΘID, i.e. UID = {u : ∃n ∈ N
s.t. (u, n) ∈ ΘID}. For each type-neutral preference u ∈ U we can define an equivalent type-interdependent
preference u ∈ UID, which is independent of the opponent’s type; that is, u′ (σ, σ′, θ′) = u′′ (σ, σ′, θ′′) for each
u′, u′′ ∈ UID. Let UN denote the set of all such type-interdependent versions of the type-neutral preferences
of the baseline model. To simplify the statements of the results of Section 4.3, in what follows we assume that
UN ⊆ UID.
Next, we amend the definitions of Nash equilibrium, undominated strategies, and deception equilibrium. The
best-reply correspondence now takes both strategies and types as arguments: BRu (σ′, θ′) = arg maxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ′, θ′).
Accordingly we adjust the definition of the set of Nash equilibria,
NE (θ, θ′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ′, θ′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ, θ)} ,
and the set of undominated strategies,
Σ (θ) = {σ ∈ ∆ (A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) and θ′ ∈ ΘID such that σ ∈ BRu (σ′, θ′)} .
Finally, we adapt the definition of deception equilibrium. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ , a strategy profile
(σ˜, σ˜′) is a deception equilibrium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(θ′)
uθ (σ, σ′, θ′) .
The interpretation of this definition is that the deceiver is able to induce both a belief about the deceiver’s
preferences, and a belief the deceiver’s intention, in the mind of the deceived party. Let DE (θ, θ′) be the set of
all such deception equilibria. The rest of our model remains unchanged.
Some of the following results rely on the existence of preferences ua˜a˜′,n˜ that satisfy two conditions: (1) action
a˜ is a (subjective) dominant action against an opponent with the same preferences and with cognitive level n˜,
and (2) action a˜′ is the dominant action against all other opponents. Formally:
Definition 11. Given any two actions a˜, a˜′ ∈ A, let ua˜a˜′,n˜ be the discriminating preferences defined by the
18The circularity comes from the fact that each type contains a preferences component, which is identified with a utility function
defined over types (and action profiles). To see that this creates a problem if the set of types is unrestricted, let U∗ be the set of all
utility functions that we want to include in our model. Hence Θ∗ = U∗ × N is the set of all types. If U∗∗ is the set of all mappings
u : A× A×Θ∗ → R, or, equivalently, U∗∗ is the set of all mappings u : A× A× U∗ × N→ R, then clearly we have U∗∗ 6= U∗. See
also footnote 10 in Herold and Kuzmics (2009).
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following utility function: for all a, a′ ∈ A and θ′ ∈ UID,
ua˜a˜′,n˜ (a, a′, θ′) =
{
1
(
θ′ =
(
ua˜a˜′,n˜, n˜
)
and a = a˜
)
or
(
θ′ 6=
(
ua˜a˜′,n˜, n˜
)
and a = a˜′
)
0 otherwise.
Finally, define the effective cost of deceiving cognitive level n, denoted by c (n), as the minimal ratio between
the additional cognitive cost and the probability of deceiving an opponent of cognitive level n:
c (n) = min
m>n
km − kn
q (m,n) .
Note that c (1) ≡ c, which coheres with the definition of the effective cost of deception (with respect to cognitive
level 1) in the baseline model.
4.2 Pure Maxmin and Minimal Fitness
The pure maxmin and minmax values give a minimal bound to the fitness of an NSC. Given a game G = (A, pi) ,
define M and M¯ as its pure maxmin and minmax values, respectively:
M = max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
pi (a1, a2) , M = min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
The pure maxmin value M is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in the sequential game in
which she plays first, and the opponent replies in an arbitrary way (i.e. not necessarily maximising the opponent’s
fitness.) The pure minmax value M is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in the sequential
game in which her opponent plays first an arbitrary action, and she best-replies to the opponent’s pure action.
It is immediate that M ≤M and that the minmax value in mixed actions is between these two values.
Let aM
¯
be a maxmin action of a player; i.e. an action aM
¯
guarantees that the player’s payoff is at least M¯,
and let aM¯ be a minmax action, i.e. an action that guarantees that the opponent’s payoff is at most M¯ :
aM ∈ arg max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
pi (a1, a2) , aM¯ ∈ arg min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
Proposition 3 (which holds also in the baseline model with type-neutral preferences) shows that the maxmin
value is a lower bound on the fitness payoff obtained in an NSC. The intuition is that if the payoff is lower, then
a mutant of cognitive level 1, with preferences such that the maxmin action aM is dominant, will outperform the
incumbents.
Definition 12. Given a pure action a∗ ∈ A, let ua∗ ∈ UN be the (type-neutral) preferences in which the player
obtains a payoff of 1 if she plays a∗ and a payoff of 0 otherwise (i.e. a∗ is a dominant action regardless of the
opponent’s preferences).
Proposition 3. Suppose that (uaM , 1) ∈ ΘID. If (µ, b) is an NSC then Π (µ, b) ≥M .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Π (µ, b) < M . Consider a monomorphic group of mutants with type (uaM , 1) .
The fact that aM is a maxmin action implies that pi(uaM ,1)
((
µ˜, b˜
)) ≥ M in any post-entry configuration. Fur-
thermore, due to continuity it holds that Πθ
(
µ˜, b˜
)
< M for any θ ∈ C (µ) in all sufficiently close focal post-entry
configurations. This contradicts that µ is an NSS in Γ(µ˜,b˜), and thus it contradicts that (µ, b) is an NSC.
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4.3 Characterisation of Pure Stable Configurations
In this subsection we show that, essentially, a pure configuration is stable if and only if (1) all incumbents have
the same cognitive level n, (2) the cost of level n is smaller than the difference between the incumbents’ (fitness)
payoff and the minmax/maxmin values, and (3) the deviation gain is smaller than the effective cost of deceiving
cognitive level n.
We begin by formally stating and proving the necessity claim.
Proposition 4. If (µ∗, a∗) is a pure NSC then the following holds: (1) if θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) then nθ = nθ′ = n for
some n, (2) pi (a∗, a∗)−M ≥ kn, and (3) g (a∗) ≤ c (n).
Proof.
1. Since all players earn the same game payoff of pi (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same cognitive cost, or
else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced (which would contradict the fact
that (µ, a∗) is an NSC).
2. Assume to the contrary that pi (a∗, a∗) −M < kn. A mutant of type (pi, 1) will be able to earn at least
M against incumbents in any post-entry focal configuration. As the fraction of mutants vanishes the
average fitness of mutants is weakly higher than M , whereas the fitness of the incumbents converges to
pi (a∗, a∗)− kn. Thus, if it were the case that pi (a∗, a∗)−M < kn, then the mutants would outperform the
incumbents.
3. Assume to the contrary that g (a∗) > c (n). This implies that there exists a cognitive level m > n such that
g (a∗) > km−knq(m,n) . Let a˜ be the fitness best reply against a∗. Let u˜ ∈ UN be the type-neutral preferences
that assign a subjective payoff of one if the agent plays either a˜ or a∗ and the opponent plays a∗, and zero
otherwise, i.e. u˜ (a, a′, θ′) = 1a∈{a∗,a˜} and a′=a∗ . There is a focal post-entry configuration in which all agents
play action a∗ in all interactions except when a deceiving mutant plays action a˜. A mutant of type (u˜,m)
will then earn pi (a∗, a∗) + g (a∗) · q (m,n) against the incumbents. As the fraction of mutants vanishes the
average fitness of mutants is weakly higher than
pi (a∗, a∗) + g (a∗) · q (m,n)− km > pi (a∗, a∗) + (km − kn)− km = pi (a∗, a∗)− kn,
whereas the fitness of the incumbents is weakly below pi (a∗, a∗)−kn. Thus, if it were true that g (a∗) > c (n),
the mutants would (weakly) outperform the incumbents.
Next, we state and prove the sufficiency claim.
Proposition 5. Suppose that θˆ :=
(
ua∗aM¯,n , n
)
∈ ΘID. If pi (a∗, a∗) −M > kn, and g (a∗) < c (n), then
(
θˆ, a∗
)
is an ESC.
Proof. Suppose that all incumbents are of type
(
ua∗aM¯,n , n
)
. Note that in all focal post-entry configurations the
incumbent θˆ always plays either a∗ or aM¯ . Moreover, whenever an incumbent agent is non-deceived, then she
plays action a∗ against a fellow incumbent and action aM¯ against a mutant. The fact that pi (a∗, a∗)− kn > M
implies that any mutant θ 6= θˆ with cognitive level nθ′ ≤ n earns a strictly lower payoff against the incumbents
in any focal post-entry configuration. As a result, if the frequency of mutants is sufficiently small, then they are
strictly outperformed. Against a mutant (θ′, n′) with cognitive level n′ > n, an incumbent may play action a∗ only
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when she is being deceived. Since pi (a∗, a∗) > M the mutants earn (on average) at most pi (a∗, a∗)+g (a∗)·q (n′, n)
in matches against incumbents. Consequently, as the fraction of mutants vanishes, the average fitness of mutants
is weakly less than
pi (a∗, a∗) + g (a∗) · q (n′, n)− kn′ < pi (a∗, a∗) + kn
′ − kn
q (n′, n) · q (n
′, n)− kn′ = pi (a∗, a∗)− kn,
and the average fitness of the incumbents converges to pi (a∗, a∗)−kn′ . Hence, the mutants are outperformed.
In particular, our results imply that:
1. Any pure equilibrium that induces a payoff above the minmax value M is the outcome of a pure ESC
(regardless of the cost of deception).
2. If the effective cost of deception is sufficiently small, then only Nash equilibria can be the outcomes of pure
NSCs. Specifically, this is the case if c (n) < g (a) for each cognitive level n and each action a such that
(a, a) is not a Nash equilibrium of the fitness game.
3. If there is a cognitive level n, such that (1) the cost of achieving level n is sufficiently small, and (2) the
effective cost of deceiving an opponent of level n is sufficiently high, then essentially any pure profile is
the outcome of a pure ESC (similar to the results of Herold and Kuzmics, 2009, in the setup without
deception). Formally, let A′ ⊆ A be the set of actions that induce a payoff above the minmax value:
A′ =
{
a ∈ A|pi (a, a) > M¯}. Assume that there is a cognitive level n, such that (1) kn < pi (a, a) − M¯ for
each action a ∈ A′ and (2) c (n) > g (a) for each action a. Then any action a ∈ A′ is the outcome of a pure
ESC (in which all incumbents have cognitive level n).
4.4 Application: In-group Cooperation and Out-group Exploitation
The following table represents a family of Hawk-Dove games. When both players play D (Dove) they earn 1
each and when they both play H (Hawk) they earn 0. When a player plays H against an opponent playing D,
she obtains an additional gain of g > 0 and the opponent incurs a loss of l ∈ (0, 1).
H D
H 0, 0 1 + g, 1− l
D 1− l, 1 + g 1, 1
. (1)
It is natural to think of a mutual play of D as the cooperative outcome. We define preferences that induce players
to cooperate with their own kind and to seek to exploit those who are not of their own kind.
Definition 13. Let un denote the preferences such that:
1. If uθ′ = un and nθ′ = n then un (D, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (H, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
2. If uθ′ 6= un or nθ′ 6= n then un (H, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (D, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
Thus, when facing someone who is of the same type, an individual with un-preferences strictly prefers co-
operation, in the sense of playing D. When facing someone who is not of the same type, an individual with
un-preferences strictly prefers the aggressive action H.
To simplify the analysis and the notation in this example we assume that a player always succeeds in deceiving
an opponent with a lower cognitive level; i.e. we assume that q (n, n′) = 1 whenever n 6= n′.
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Under the assumption that g > l and that the marginal cognitive costs are sufficiently small (but non-
vanishing), we construct an ESC in which only individuals with preferences from {ui}∞i=1 are present. Individuals
of different cognitive levels coexist, and non-Nash profiles are played in all matches between equals. When
individuals of the same level meet, they play mutual cooperation (D,D). When individuals of different levels
meet, the higher level plays H and the lower level plays D. The gain from obtaining the high payoff of 1 + g
against lower types is exactly counterbalanced by the higher cognitive costs. By contrast, if g < l then the game
does not admit this kind of stable configuration.
Proposition 6. Let G be the game represented in (1), where g > 0 and l ∈ (0, 1). Assume that q (n, n′) = 1
whenever n 6= n′. Suppose that the marginal cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing, so that (a) there is an N
such that kN ≤ l + g < kN+1, and (b) it holds that g > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N .
(i) If g > l then there exists an ESC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed (i.e.
|C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of the incumbents is as follows: if the individuals in a match are of different
cognitive levels, then the higher level plays H and the lower level plays D; if both individuals in a match are of
the same cognitive level, then they both play D.
(ii) If g = l then there exists an NSC with the above properties.
(iii) If g < l then there does not exist any NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}∞n=1.
The formal proof is presented in Appendix B.3.
Remark 6. It is possible to construct an ESC that is like Proposition 6(i) except that when incumbents of the
same cognitive level meet they play the mixed equilibrium of the Hawk-Dove game. Thus we can have ESCs in
which agents mix at the individual level. For instance, this can be accomplished by considering preferences um
such that: (1) if uθ′ = um and nθ′ = n then um (a, a′, θ′) = pi (a, a′, θ′) for all a and a′, and (2) if uθ′ 6= um or
nθ′ 6= n then un (H, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (D, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
5 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
We have developed a model in which preferences coevolve with the ability to detect others’ preferences and
misrepresent one’s own preferences. To this end, we have allowed for heterogeneity with respect to costly
cognitive ability. The assumption of an exogenously given level of observability of the opponent’s preferences,
which has characterised the indirect evolutionary approach up until now, is replaced by the Machiavellian notion
of deception equilibrium, which endogenously determines what each player observes. Our model assumes a
very powerful form of deception. This allows us to derive sharp results that clearly demonstrate the effects of
endogenising observation and introducing deception. We think that the “Bayesian” deception is an interesting
model for future research: each incumbent type is associated with a signal, agents with high cognitive levels can
mimic the signals of types with lower cognitive levels, and agents maximise their preferences given the received
signals and the correct Bayesian inference about the opponent’s type.
In a companion paper (Heller and Mohlin, 2017a) we study environments in which players are randomly
matched, and make inferences about the opponent’s type by observing her past behaviour (rather than directly
observing her type, as is standard in the “indirect evolutionary approach”). In future research, it would be
interesting to combine both approaches and allow the observation of past behaviour to be influenced by deception.
Most papers taking the indirect evolutionary approach study the stability of preferences defined over material
outcomes. Moreover, it is common to restrict attention to some parameterised class of such preferences. Since
we study preferences defined on the more abstract level of action profiles (or the joint set of action profiles and
opponent’s types in the case of type-interdependent preferences) we do not make predictions about whether some
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particular kind of preferences over material outcomes, from a particular family of utility functions, will be stable
or not. It would be interesting to extend our model to such classes of preferences. Furthermore, with preferences
defined over material outcomes it would be possible to study coevolution of preferences and deception not only
in isolated games, but also when individuals play many different games using the same preferences. We hope to
come back to these questions and we invite others to employ and modify our framework in these directions.
A Formal Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
A.1 Preliminaries
This subsection contains notation and definitions that will be used in the following proofs.
A generous action is an action such that if played by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve the maximal
fitness payoff. Formally:
Definition 14. Action ag ∈ A is generous, if there exists a ∈ A such that pi (a, ag) ≥ pi (a′, a′′) for all a′, a′′ ∈ A.
Fix a generous action ag ∈ A of the game G. A second-best generous action is an action such that if played
by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve the fitness payoff that is maximal under the constraint that the
opponent is not allowed to play the generous action ag. Formally:
Definition 15. Action ag2 ∈ A is second-best generous, conditional on ag ∈ A being first-best generous, if there
exists a ∈ A such that pi (a, ag2) ≥ pi (a′, a′′) for all a′, a′′ ∈ A such that a′′ 6= ag.
Fix a generous action ag ∈ A, and fix a second-best generous action ag2 ∈ A, conditional on ag ∈ A being
first-best generous. For each α ≥ β ≥ 0, let uα,β be the following utility function:
uα,β (a, a′) =

α a′ = ag
β a′ = ag2
0 otherwise.
Observe that such a utility function uα,β satisfies:
1. Indifference: the utility function only depends on the opponent’s action; i.e. the player is indifferent
between any two of her own actions.
2. Pro-generosity: the utility is highest if the opponent plays the generous action, second-highest if the
opponent plays the second-best generous action, and lowest otherwise.
Let UGI = {uα,β |α ≥ β ≥ 0} be the family of all such preferences, called pro-generous indifferent preferences.
Note that Ug includes a continuum of different utilities (under the assumption that G includes at least three
actions). Thus, for any set of incumbent types, we can always find a utility function in Ug that does not belong
to any of the current incumbents.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (Behaviour of the Highest Types)
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 1
Assume to the contrary that pi
(
bN
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(
θ¯
))
< p¯i. (Note that the definition of p¯i implies that the opposite
inequality is impossible.) Let a1, a2 ∈ A be any two actions such that (a1, a2) is an efficient action profile,
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i.e. 0.5 · (pi (a1, a2) + pi (a1, a2)) = p¯i. Let θ1, θ2, θ3 be three types that satisfy the following conditions: (1)
the types are not incumbents: θ1, θ2, θ3 /∈ C (µ∗), (2) the types have the highest incumbent cognitive level:
nθ1 = nθ2 = nθ3 = n¯, and (3) the types have different pro-generosity indifferent preferences; uθ1 , uθ2 , uθ3 ∈ UGI
and uθi 6= uθj for each i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass 13 to each of these types.
The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ +  · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as
follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ′) = bNθ (θ′) and b˜Dθ (θ′) = bDθ (θ′) for each incumbent
pair θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. The mutants play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against incumbents with lower cognitive lev-
els:
(
b˜Dθi (θ
′) , b˜Dθ′ (θi)
) ∈ FMDE (θi, θ′) for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯. Note that
FMDE (θi, θ′) is nonempty in virtue of the construction of UGI .
3. In matches without deception between mutants and incumbents, the mutants mimic θ¯ and the incumbents
play the same way they play against θ¯:
(
b˜Nθi (θ
′) , b˜Nθ′ (θi)
)
=
(
bN
θ¯
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ¯
))
, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
4. Two mutants of different types play efficiently when meeting each other: b˜Nθi
(
θ(i+1)mod 3
)
= a1 and
b˜Nθi
(
θ(i−1)mod 3
)
= a2 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
5. When two mutants of the same type meet, they play the same way θ¯ plays against itself: b˜Nθi (θi) = b
N
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
In virtue of point 1 the construction
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By points 2 and 3
each mutant θi earns weakly more than θ¯ against all incumbent types. By points 4 and 5 each mutant earns
strictly more than θ¯ against the mutants. In total the average fitness earned by each mutant is strictly higher
than that of θ¯, against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗
in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in
Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is not an NSC.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 2
Assume to the contrary that
((
bD
θ¯
(θ) , bDθ
(
θ¯
))) 6∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ). Let θˆ be a type that satisfies the conditions
of: (1) not being an incumbent: θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent cognitive level: nθˆ = n¯, and (3)
having pro-generous indifferent preferences: uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type
θˆ. The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as
follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ′) = bNθ (θ′) and b˜Dθ (θ′) = bDθ (θ′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches with deception between mutants and incumbents , behaviour is such that the mutants maximise
their fitness:
(
b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯.
3. In matches without deception between mutants and incumbents, the mutants mimic θ¯ and the incumbents
play the same way they play against θ¯:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Nθ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bN
θ¯
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ¯
))
, for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
4. The mutant θˆ plays against itself the same way θ¯ plays against itself:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
)
, b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
))
=
(
b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
))
.
25
Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)) and that θˆ obtains a strictly higher fitness than θ¯
against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population
game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in Γ(µ˜,b˜), which
implies that µ∗ is not an NSC.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 3
Assume to the contrary that pi
(
θ, θ¯
)
> p¯i, which immediately implies that pi
(
θ¯, θ
)
< p¯i and that either pi
(
b
|D
θ
(
θ¯
)
, bD
θ¯
(θ)
)
>
p¯i or pi
(
bNθ
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(θ)
)
> p¯i. Let θˆ be a type that satisfies the conditions of: (1) not being an incumbent:
θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent cognitive level: nθˆ = n¯, and (3) having pro-generous indiffer-
ent preferences: uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type θˆ. The post-entry type
distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ′) = bNθ (θ′) and b˜Dθ (θ′) = bDθ (θ′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches with deception between mutants and incumbents, behaviour is such that the mutants maximise
their fitness:
(
b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯.
3. In a match between a mutant θˆ and the incumbent θ¯, the mutant mimics θ, and the incumbent θ¯ plays
the same way it plays against θ:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bNθ
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(θ)
)
if pi
(
bNθ
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(θ)
)
> p¯i, and(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bDθ
(
θ¯
)
, bD
θ¯
(θ)
)
otherwise.
4. The mutant θˆ plays against itself the same way θ¯ plays against itself:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
)
, b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
))
=
(
b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
))
.
5. The mutant θˆ mimics θ¯ against all other incumbents without deception, and these incumbents play against
θˆ in the same way they play against θ¯:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Nθ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bN
θ¯
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ¯
))
for each θ′ 6= θ¯.
Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more
than θ¯ against lower types. By point 3 and Theorem 1.1, the mutants earn strictly more than θ¯ against type θ¯.
By points 3 and 4 and Theorem 1.1, the mutant earns strictly more than θ¯ against the mutant. By point 5 the
mutant θˆ earns the same as θ¯ against all other types. In total the average fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher
than that of θ¯, against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗
in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in
Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is not an NSC.
A.3 Proof of Case (A) in Theorem 2
In what follows we fill in the missing technical details for the part of the proof of Theorem 2 that concerns case
(A). We begin by proving a lemma.
Lemma 2. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2) then there exist actions a1, a′1 ∈ C (σ1) and a2, a′2 ∈ C (σ2) such that:
(a1, a2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), and (a′1, a′2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), with pi (a1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2), and pi (a′1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2).
Proof. Note that for any mixed deception equilibrium (σ1, σ2) and any action a ∈ C (σ2), the profile (σ1, a)
is also a deception equilibrium (because otherwise the deceiver would not induce the deceived party to take a
mixed action that puts positive weight on a). It follows that there are actions a2, a′2 ∈ C (σ2) such that (σ1, a2)
and (σ1, a′2) are deception equilibria, with pi (σ1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2) and pi (σ1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2). Furthermore, if
(σ1, a2) and (σ1, a′2) are deception equilibria, then for any action a ∈ C (σ1), the profiles (a, a2) and (a, a′2)
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are also deception equilibria, with pi (σ1, a2) = pi (a, a2) and pi (σ1, a′2) = pi (a, a′2). Hence there are actions
a1, a
′
1 ∈ C (σ1) such that (a1, a2) and (a′1, a′2) are deception equilibria, with pi (a1, a2) = pi (σ1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2),
and pi (a1, a′2) = pi (σ1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2).
Assume that case (A) holds: there is an incumbent θ˚ that plays inefficiently against itself, i.e.
(
bN
θ˚
(
θ˚
)
, bN
θ˚
(
θ˚
))
6= (a¯, a¯), and there is no incumbent type with a strictly higher cognitive level than θ˚ that satisfies any of the
cases (A), (B), or (C). To prove that this cannot hold in an NSC we introduce a mutant θˆ =
(
uˆ, nθ˚
)
/∈ C (µ∗) .
If Σ
(
uθ˚
)
= ∆, then we let uˆ ∈ UGI be such that θˆ =
(
uˆ, nθ˚
)
/∈ C (µ∗). If Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆, then we fix a dominated
action a ∈ A\Σ (uθ˚), and let uˆ be defined as follows:
uˆ (a, a′) =

maxa∈A
(
uθ˚ (a, a¯)
)
a = a′ = a¯
uθ˚ (a, a′)− βa′ a = a and a′ 6= a¯
uθ˚ (a, a′) otherwise,
where each βa′ ≥ 0 is chosen such that θˆ =
(
uˆ, nθ˚
)
/∈ C (µ∗). That is, if Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆, then the utility function uˆ is
constructed from the utility function uθ˚ by arbitrarily lowering the payoff of some of the outcomes associated with
the (already) dominated action a and that do not involve action a¯, while increasing the payoff of the outcome
(a¯, a¯) by the minimal amount that makes a¯ a best reply to itself. Note that this definition of uˆ is valid also for
the case of a¯ = a. It follows that a ∈ Σ (uθ˚) ∪ {a¯} iff a ∈ Σ (uˆ). To see this, note that if Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆ and a = a¯,
then Σ (uˆ) = Σ
(
uθ˚
) ∪ {a¯}. Otherwise Σ (uˆ) = Σ (uθ˚). Thus, θˆ can be induced to play exactly the same pure
actions as θ˚, unless a¯ = a, in which case θˆ can be induced to play a¯ in addition to all actions that θ˚ can be
induced to play.
Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type
(
nθ˚, uˆ
)
. Let the post-entry type distribution be
µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′, and let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ′) = bNθ (θ′) and b˜Dθ (θ′) = bDθ (θ′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches without deception between the mutant type θˆ and any incumbent type θ′, the mutant θˆ mimics
θ˚, and the incumbent θ′ treats the mutant θˆ like the incumbent θ˚:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Nθ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bN
θ˚
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ˚
))
for all θ′ such that nθ′ = nθ˚ and θ′ 6= θˆ.
3. In matches with deception between the mutant type θˆ and any lower type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (with nθ′ < nθˆ), we
distinguish two cases.
(a) Suppose that Σ
(
uθ˚
)
= ∆. In this case let
(
b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
. Note that FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
is nonempty since in this case uˆ ∈ UGI .
(b) Suppose that Σ
(
uθ˚
) 6= ∆. In this case let (b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
= (a1, a2), for some (a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ˚, θ′
)
such that pi (a1, a2) ≥ pi
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By Lemma 2 above such a profile (a1, a2) exists.
4. The mutant plays efficiently when meeting itself: b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
)
= a¯.
5. In matches with deception between the mutant θˆ and a higher type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (nθ′ > nθˆ), we distinguish
two cases. Pick a profile (a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θ˚
)
, such that pi (a2, a1) ≥ pi
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By Lemma 2
above such a profile (a1, a2) exists. Moreover, by the construction of uˆ, it is either the case that (a1, a2) ∈
DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
, or there is some a˜ such that uθ′ (a˜, a¯) > uθ′ (a1, a2). In the latter case we have (a¯, a¯) ∈
DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
, due to the fact that
(
bDθ′ (θ′) , bDθ′ (θ′)
)
= (a¯, a¯) implies that a¯ is a best reply to a¯ for type θ′.
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(a) If uθ′ (a1, a2) > uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜D
θˆ
(θ′)
)
= (a1, a2). Note that by the definition of (a1, a2) it
holds that pi (a2, a1) ≥ pi
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
.
(b) If uθ′ (a1, a2) ≤ uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜D
θˆ
(θ′)
)
= (a¯, a¯). Note that by the definition of θ˚ it holds that
pi (a¯, a¯) ≥ pi
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
.
By point 1,
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more
than θ˚ against lower types. By point 3 the mutant θˆ earns the same as θ˚ against all incumbents of level nθ˚. By
points 3 and 4 (and the assumption that θ˚ does not play efficiently against itself), the mutant θˆ earns strictly
more than θ˚ against θˆ. By point 5 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more than θ˚ against all incumbents of a higher
cognitive level. In total the average fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher than that of θ˚, against a population that
follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗
is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS of Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is not an
NSC. Thus we have shown that θ˚ plays efficiently against itself.
B Constructions of Heterogeneous NSCs in Examples
The first subsection presents a lemma on stable heterogeneous populations, which will later be used to construct
NSCs in the Rock-Paper-Scissors and Hawk-Dove games, with type-neutral and type-interdependent preferences.
As we assume in these examples that q (n, n′) = 1 whenever n 6= n′, we simplify the notation by omitting
the superscript of bN and bD in the proofs below (as only b ≡ bN is relevant in matches between agents with the
same cognitive level, and only b ≡ bD is relevant in matches between agents with different cognitive levels).
B.1 A Useful Lemma on Stable Heterogeneous Populations
Consider a configuration (µ, b), consisting of a type distribution with (finite) support C (µ) ⊆ {(u, n)}∞n=1, and
behaviour policies such that
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

t if nθ > nθ′
w if nθ = nθ′
s if nθ < nθ′ .
(2)
Thus t is the payoff that a player of type θ earns when deceiving an opponent of type θ′, and s is the payoff earned
by the deceived party. When two individuals of the same type meet they earn w. Our first lemma concerns the
type game Γ(µ,b) that is induced by a configuration (µ, b), such that C (µ) ⊆ {(u, n)}∞n=1 and with behaviour
policies given by (2). Although we have normalised k1 = 0 in the main text, we do not omit reference to k1 in
what follows. This is done to simplify the proofs.
Lemma 3. Suppose t ≥ w ≥ s. Suppose that there is an N such that
kN − k1 ≤ t− s < kN+1 − k1, (3)
and suppose that
t− w > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N . (4)
Consider the type game Γ(µ,b) induced by a configuration (µ, b) with a type distribution such that C (µ) ⊆
{(u, n)}∞n=1, and with behaviour policies given by (2).
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1. If 2w < s + t then Γ(µ,b) has a unique ESS µ∗ ∈ ∆ (C (µ)), which is mixed, i.e. C (µ∗) > 1, and in which
no type above N is present, i.e. C (µ∗) ⊆ {(u, n)}Nn=1.
2. If 2w = s+ t then Γ(µ,b) has an NSS µ∗ ∈ ∆ (C (µ)), which is mixed, i.e. C (µ∗) > 1, and in which no type
above N is present, i.e. C (µ∗) ⊆ {(u, n)}Nn=1.
3. If 2w > s+ t then Γ(µ,b) admits no NSS and hence no ESS.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to proving this result.
First note that type (u,N + 1) earns strictly less than (u, 1) in all population states, and (u,N) earns at least
as much as (u, 1) at least in some population state. This immediately follows from s ≤ w ≤ t and t−kN+1 < s−k1
and s−k1 ≤ t−kN . For this reason it is sufficient to consider the type distributions with support in {(u, n)}Nn=1.
The payoffs for a type game with all these types present are
(u, 1) (u, 2) (u, 3) . . . (u,N − 1) (u,N)
(u, 1) w − k1 s− k1 s− k1 . . . s− k1 s− k1
(u, 2) t− k2 w − k2 s− k2 . . . s− k2 s− k2
(u, 3) t− k3 t− k3 w − k3 . . . s− k3 s− k3
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
(u,N − 1) t− kN−1 t− kN−1 t− kN−1 . . . w − kN−1 s− kN−1
(u,N) t− kN t− kN t− kN . . . t− kN w − kN
,
or in matrix form
A =

w − k1 s− k1 s− k1 . . . s− k1 s− k1
t− k2 w − k2 s− k2 . . . s− k2 s− k2
t− k3 t− k3 w − k3 . . . s− k3 s− k3
...
...
... . . .
...
...
t− kN−1 t− kN−1 t− kN−1 . . . w − kN−1 s− kN−1
t− kN t− kN t− kN . . . t− kN w − kN

.
Inspecting the matrix A we make the following observation:
Claim 1. Consider the game with payoff matrix A. If (4) is satisfied then the following holds:
1. (u, n+ 1) is the unique best reply to n for all n ∈ {1, .., N − 2}.
2. If t− kN > s− k1 then (u,N) is the unique best reply to (u,N − 1).
3. If t− kN = s− k1 then (u,N) and (u, 1) are the only two best replies to (u,N − 1).
4. (u, 1) is the unique best reply to (u,N).
Proof. Condition (4) implies that t− kN+1 > w− kN , and the definition of N implies t− kN+1 < s− k1. Taken
together, these imply that w − kN < s− k1, which means that (u, 1) is the unique best reply to (u,N).
The definition of N entails t − kN ≥ s − k1. If t − kN > s − k1 then (u,N) is the unique best reply to
(u,N − 1). If t − kN = s − k1 then (u,N) and (u, 1) are the only two best replies to (u,N − 1). Furthermore,
(4) implies that (u, n+ 1) is the unique best reply to (u, n) for all n ∈ {1, .., N − 2}.
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It is an immediate consequence of the above lemma that all Nash equilibria of A are mixed, i.e. that they
have more than one type in their support. Next, we examine the stability properties of such equilibria. As
discussed in the proof of Theorem 2, it is well-known that if A is negative definite (semi-definite) with respect
to the tangent space, i.e. if vTAv < 0 for all v ∈ Rd0 = {v ∈ Rd :
∑d
i=1 vi = 0}, v 6= 0, then A admits a unique
ESS (but not necessarily a unique NSS). Moreover, the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of NSSs and
constitutes a nonempty convex subset of the simplex (Hofbauer and Sandholm 2009, Theorem 3.2).
One can show:
Claim 2. If 2w ≥ (≤) s+ t then A is positive (negative) semi-definite w.r.t. the tangent space.
Proof. Let
K =

−k1 −k1 . . . −k1
−k2 −k2 . . . −k2
...
... . . .
...
−kN −kN . . . −kN
 , B =

w s . . . s
t w . . . s
...
... . . .
...
t t . . . w
 ,
so that
A = B + K.
Note that vTKv = 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, so that vTAv < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, if and only if vTBv < 0 for
all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0. Moreover, note that vTBv < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, if and only if vT B¯v < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 ,
v 6= 0, where
B¯ = 12
(
B + BT
)
.
One can translate the problem to one of checking negative definiteness with respect to RN−1 rather than the
tangent space RN0 ; see, e.g., Weissing (1991). This is done with the N × (N − 1) matrix P defined by
pij =

1 if i = j and i, j < N
0 if i 6= j and i, j < N
−1 if i = N .
We have
PT B¯P =
(
w − 12 (s+ t)
)(
I + 11T
)
,
where 1 is an N − 1-dimensional vector with all entries equal to 1, and I is the identity matrix. The matrix
PT B¯P has one eigenvalue (of multiplicity N − 1) that is equal to 2w− (s+ t). Finally, note that this eigenvalue
is non-negative if and only if 2w ≥ (s+ t).
It follows that if 2w ≤ s+ t then the game with payoff matrix A admits an NSS. If 2w > s+ t then the game
does not have a mixed NSS. We are now able to prove Lemma 3.
1. If 2w < s + t then by Lemma 2 A is negative definite w.r.t. the tangent space, implying that it has a
unique ESS. Lemma 1 implies that there can be no pure Nash equilibria (and hence no pure ESS). Thus
A has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is mixed. As observed earlier, type (u,N + 1) (and higher types)
earn strictly less than (θ, 1) for all population states, which implies that this unique equilibrium remains
an ESS also when they are included in the set of feasible types.
2. If 2w = s + t then A is both positive and negative semi-definite w.r.t. the tangent space. In this case
A does not have an ESS but it does have a set of NSSs, all of which are Nash equilibria. Moreover, we
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know that A has no pure NE, and so all NSSs are mixed. Again, type (u,N + 1) (and higher types) can
be ignored because they always earn strictly less than (θ, 1).
3. If 2w < s+ t then A is positive definite w.r.t. the tangent space, implying that it has no NSC.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2: Equilibrium in Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
Formally, the behaviour of the incumbent types and the induced payoffs are as follows:
b∗θ (θ′) =

(0, 1, 0) if nθ > nθ′( 1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
if nθ = nθ′
(1, 0, 0) if nθ < nθ′ ,
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

1 if nθ > nθ′
0 if nθ = nθ′
−1 if nθ < nθ′ .
Start by restricting attention to the set of types {(upi, n)}∞n=1. That is, for the moment we use {(upi, n)}∞n=1
instead of Θ as the set of all types. All definitions can be amended accordingly. Lemma 3 in Appendix B implies
that there is an NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(upi, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed. Lemma 3 establishes that the
type game between the types {(upi, n)}Nn=1 behaves much like an N -player version of a Hawk-Dove game: it has a
unique symmetric equilibrium that is in mixed strategies and that is neutrally or evolutionarily stable, depending
on whether the payoff matrix of the type game is negative semi-definite, or negative definite, with respect to the
tangent space.
It remains to show that types not in {(upi, n)}∞n=1 are unable to invade. Suppose a mutant of type (u′, n′)
enters. Incumbents of level n > n′ will give the mutant a belief that induces the mutant to play some action
a′ and then play action a′ + 1mod 3, which is the incumbents’ best reply to a′. Thus, against incumbents of
level n > n′ the mutant earns −1. Against incumbents of level n < n′, the mutant will earn at most 1. Against
incumbents of level n′ the mutant earns at most 0. Against itself the mutant (or a group of mutants for that
matter) will earn 0. Thus any mutant of level n′ earns weakly less than the incumbents of level n′, in any focal
post-entry configuration.
Remark 7. Our analysis is similar to that of Conlisk (2001). Like us, he works with a hierarchy of cognitive types
(though in his case it is fixed and finite), where higher cognitive types incur higher cognitive costs. He stipulates
that when a high type meets a low type the high type gets 1 and the low type gets −1. If two equals meet both
get 0. He shows that there is a neutrally stable equilibrium of this game between types (using somewhat different
arguments than we do), and explores comparative static effects of changing costs. However, unlike in our model,
in Conlisk’s model all individuals have the same materialistic preferences and the payoffs earned from deception
are not derived from an underlying game.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 6: Equilibrium in Hawk-Dove with Type-Interdependent
Preferences
Recall that we focus on a deterministic deception function: q (n, n′) = 1 for each n 6= n′. Thus we omit the
superscript of bN and bDin the proof below. Formally, the behaviour of an incumbent θ ∈ C (µ∗) facing another
incumbent θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) and the induced payoffs are as follows:
b∗θ (θ′) =
{
D if nθ ≥ nθ′
H if nθ < nθ′ ,
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

1 + g if nθ > nθ′
1 if nθ = nθ′
1− l if nθ < nθ′ .
(5)
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Start by restricting attention to the set of types {(un, n)}∞n=1. That is, for the moment, let {(un, n)}∞n=1, instead
of ΘID, be the set of all types. All definitions can be amended accordingly. Under this restriction on the set
of types, the desired results (i)–(iii) follow from Lemma 3 in Appendix B. For example, to see that Lemma 3
implies part (i) for the restricted type set, note that g > l implies that 2w < t + s, and g > kn+1 − kn implies
that t− w > kn+1 − kn, in the language of Lemma 3. The arguments for (ii) and (iii) are analogous.
Next, allow for a larger set of types ΘID, such that {(un, n)}∞n=1 ⊆ ΘID. The fact that part (iii) of Proposition
6 holds for the restricted set of types implies that it also holds for any larger set of types. It remains to prove
parts (i) and (ii) for the full set of types. We prove only part (i). The proof of part (ii) is very similar.
Consider a population consisting exclusively of types from the set {(un, n)}∞n=1, and assume that the type
distribution of these incumbents, together with the behaviour policy (5), would have constituted an ESC if the
type set had been restricted to {(un, n)}∞n=1. Suppose a mutant of type (u′, n′) /∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1 enters. If it is
the case that type
(
un
′
, n′
)
is not among the incumbents, then by the definition of an ESC, it must earn weakly
less against the incumbents than what the incumbents earn against each other. Thus it is sufficient to show that
the mutant of type (u′, n′) earns less than what a mutant or incumbent of the same cognitive level, i.e. type(
un
′
, n′
)
, earns.
Against an incumbent (un, n) of level n > n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1− l, and type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1− l. Against an incumbent (un, n) of level n = n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1− l, and type(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1. Against incumbents (un, n) of level n < n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1 + g, and
type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1 + g. Thus, against an incumbent (un, n) of level n ≥ n′ a mutant (u′, n′) /∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1
earns strictly less than what a mutant or incumbent of type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns, and against an incumbent (un, n)
of level n < n′ a mutant (u′, n′) /∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1 earns weakly less than what a mutant or incumbent of type(
un
′
, n′
)
earns. Hence, if mutants are sufficiently rare, they will earn strictly less than incumbents in any focal
post-entry configuration.
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